Strategic factor markets,scale free resources,and economic performance: The impact of product market rivalry

This paper analyzes how scale free resources, which can be acquired by multiple firms simultaneously and deployed against one another in product market competition, will be priced in strategic factor markets, and what the consequences are for the acquiring firms' performance. Based on a game‐theoretic model, it shows how the impact of strategic factor markets on economic profits is influenced by product market rivalry, preexisting competitive (dis)advantages, and the interaction of acquired resources with those preexisting asymmetries. New insights include the result that resource suppliers will aim at (and largely succeed in) setting resource prices so that the acquiring firms earn negative strategic factor market profits—sacrificing some of their preexisting market power rents—by acquiring resources that they know to be overpriced. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Location choices under strategic interactions

We explore a fundamental aspect of firms' location choices largely overlooked in the literature: strategic interaction. We formalize the notion that strategic interaction renders collocation less appealing by fostering competition, which erodes firms' profits. Strategic interaction also impacts location choices across time. Specifically, because firms learn by doing in markets, location choices are shaped by two novel effects: entrenchment benefits from entering early in a market and improving capabilities relative to rivals, and opportunity costs from postponing entry to other markets where rivals enter and learn. When learning is local, firms collocate more: rivals are preempted from improving relative capabilities in higher‐value markets. However, when learning is global, firms collocate less: they can transfer capabilities from lower‐value to higher‐value markets, blocking rivals from achieving entrenchment benefits. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

竞合战略：企业间新型的互动方式

随着科技与信息的飞速革新,组织将会面临复杂的跨地域、跨行业和跨文化的商业决策,使得组织面临更大的生存压力。而竞合战略会逐渐取代单纯的战略竞争与合作联盟,成为企业战略管理的有效手段。     

绿色物流地产策略博弈分析

基于博弈论理念,将“绿色物流”融合贯穿于物流地产,以实现物流地产的经济效益和社会效益。通过政府与物流地产开发商间的博弈分析、物流地产开发商之间的博弈分析,发现无论从政府角度,还是从物流地产开发商角度,采取绿色物流策略均为最优决策。     

多供给方情形下物流联盟伙伴的利益分配

本文认为,物流联盟带来的利益可以有很多形式,但每一种利益都可归结为给物流需求方带来的成本节约,即经济利益。当物流需求方自行组织物流得到与物流外包同质的物流服务时,前者的成本与后者的成本之差即为其由物流联盟带来的总利益。在用合作博弈的思想讨论物流联盟伙伴的利益分配时,假设条件都非常强。这使得按照合作博弈思路进行利益分配的结果,对现实的指导意义大大减弱。假设只有两个具有完成物流需求方物流任务能力的物流供给方;利益分配通过暗标拍卖的方式来确定,建立暗标拍卖模型,通过分析,结果表明,物流联盟的总利益及物流需求方的利益均与供给方的成本及行业平均利润率有关。     

Adoption Dynamics in Buyer-Side Exchanges

The purpose of this paper is to understand buyer/seller adoption dynamics in independent, buyer-side B2B exchanges. In a stylized model, we assume that the main role of the exchange is to reduce search costs for buyers. Buyers and sellers enter or exit the exchange based on the relative economic surplus (loss) they receive inside vs. outside the exchange. We contrast two situations: one where participants' switching cost to join the institution is negligible and another, in which it is significant. In an extension, we also explore the impact of buyer/seller heterogeneity on adoption dynamics. We have three key findings with relevant implications for practice. First, we find that the general view that demand and supply (so-called liquidity) either grows or shrinks in the marketplace may not hold. In the presence of switching costs, the exchange can evolve to a stable state with only partial market participation. Second, our results suggest that the exchange is better off subsidizing buyers as opposed to sellers in order to achieve the so-called critical mass, beyond which there is full participation. Finally, we find that while in general, minor buyers of the industry have more incentive joining the exchange, when the fixed participation fee of the exchange is high, it is major buyers who are likely to join first. For sellers, this is not the case: minor sellers are always more keen in participating in a buyer-side exchange.     

基于博弈论分析合同在降低市场力方面的作用

统一的出清电价机制对发电商持留发电容量具有激励作用 ,从而增加了发电商滥用市场力的可能。市场力的存在不利于电力市场的持续健康发展 ,而博弈论的分析是一个可以有效提供策略的方法。简述了博弈论的基本概念及发展历史 ,并采用博弈理论分析了合同在有效降低市场力方面的作用     

企业集群内社会资本演进的动力机制研究

本文从经济社会学的视角指出,企业集群内社会资本是一种摄取稀缺资源并由此获益的能力,它随着企业集群这一产业组织的成长发展而不断演进,据此提出了企业集群内社会资本演进的一般过程.对其演进过程,运用动态博弈模型分析了企业集群内社会资本演进的动力机制--声誉机制.     

基于演化博弈的城市拆迁补偿机制研究

房屋动拆迁是我国城市建设与旧城改造中的重要环节,也是当前社会普遍关注的焦点。房屋动拆迁问题产生的重要原因在于补偿机制的不合理。本文引入演化博弈理论,建立城市拆迁补偿的演化博弈模型,分析不同收益值情况下的演化稳定策略,并针对当前拆迁补偿机制存在的漏洞,提出完善我国城市房屋拆迁补偿机制的政策建议。     

基于进化博弈的企业倾销与反倾销分析

基于博弈参与人的有限理性假设，文章通过运用进化博弈的分析工具，构建企业倾销与反倾销博弈的复制动态模型，以此得出结论：无论是面对国外对华反倾销，还是面对外国产品倾销，中国企业关键是实施自我保护战略，调整利益结构，以实现合作竞争。